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1. Introduction
The Stability and Growth Pact is a continuing source of economic
controversy within Europe. The pact is aimed at enforcing fiscal dis-
cipline on the member states of Europe, with the twin objectives of (1)
maintaining the conditions for sustainable real growth in output and
employment; and (2) providing the foundations for price stability. The
pact recognizes that individual member states experience divergent
business cycle conditions which may lead them to run deficits at certain
points in time. However, the pact is designed to encourage member
states to adopt fiscal policies which imply zero deficits on average and
to limit their deficits to 3 percent of GDP at any point in time.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) involves two key ideas. First,
it is based on the view that the fiscal policies of one member state are
important to the other member states. Second, it is based on the view
that the fiscal policy of the member states—particularly the national
indebtedness—is important for the monetary policy of the European
Central Bank and the behavior of the price level.
Our objective in this paper is to explore the first of these ideas
in the context of a small and entirely real dynamic general equili-
brium model of a multi-country economic union. We think that this
is a logical starting point for two reasons. First, we believe that there
are underlying real forces operating within economies that are highly
important for the fiscal policies of member states. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to understand the effects of these forces both on the individual
member state and on the other members of the economic community.
Second, modern models that give a central bank leverage over real
economic activity frequently do so effectively by allowing the central
bank to affect distortions arising from imperfect competition. These208 Baxter & King
distortions have an alternative interpretation as tax rates, so that the
consequences of alternative monetary policies and the design of optimal
monetary policies are closely related to fiscal policy issues. Thus, mon-
etary policy can frequently be given a fiscal policy interpretation. Fur-
ther, desirable monetary policies depend heavily on the nature of fiscal
policy.
1
The model that we construct is parsimonious, designed to permit
sharp focus on two key issues. First, we study the nature of fiscal exter-
nalities within an economic community such as the EU which lacks
explicit rules for fiscal policy coordination. Second, to the extent that
these externalities exist, we ask whether public sector deficits are a
useful indicator of the extent of these fiscal externalities, as seems to
have been believed by policymakers who framed the fiscal policy rules
codified in the SGR Our model abstracts from investment and capi-
tal formation and assumes that individual governments can commit
to following dynamically optimal fiscal policies. Further, government
expenditure is taken to be exogenous as is traditional in standard mod-
els of optimal taxation and optimal monetary policy.
There are two key observations about current fiscal policy in the EMU
that we build into our model. First, all countries in the EMU employ
national sales taxes (VAT) as well as income taxes, but there is consider-
able heterogeneity in terms of the relative use of these taxes. Second,
in all countries, government expenditure contains four major compo-
nents—purchases of goods and services; public employment; invest-
ment in government capital; and transfer payments. However, there is
considerable heterogeneity across countries in the relative importance
of these components.
The SGP is cast in terms of government deficits. However, our model
highlights the international transmission of fiscal policy between coun-
tries not via the government deficit, but via the country's net exports,
which we define as
where yt is private output of country j at date t; ct is the amount of
private consumption by country / at date t; and g°.t is the amount of
government consumption in country j at date t. A higher level of net
exports by an individual country in a given period has effects on other
members of the economic community. If, for example, a country plans
to run a surplus in net exports in a future period, that will have the
effect of reducing the interest rate applicable to that period, with theFiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 209
strength of this effect depending on the relative size of the country run-
ning the surplus. The government surplus in our model is
sjt = T
njtwjtnjt + r
cjtcjt - zvjtg; - g
cjt (2)
where w.t is the wage rate; g".t is government labor input, n.t is total
labor input; t
nf is the tax on labor income; and i°.t is the consumption
tax. There are well-known economic mechanisms that make the trade
deficit and the government deficit tend to move together. For example,
holding other variables fixed, a rise in government consumption will
increase both the fiscal deficit and the trade deficit. Through the trade
channel, an individual country's fiscal policy can have effects on other
countries which are transmitted via prices (here, the only price is the
intertemporal price, i.e., the interest rate). However, the comovement
of the fiscal and trade deficits clearly depends on the tax system, i.e.,
on the tax rates T", and T
0... TO learn about the character of "fiscal exter-
nalities" of national policies, we determine the behavior of optimal tax
rates within several alternative settings. Our model also incorporates
exogenous, time-varying levels of productivity, government purchases,
and government labor input.
Our results can be briefly summarized as follows. For a small country
within our basic model, which knows that its policies have no effect on
community-wide interest rates, it is optimal to set tax rates constant
over time. However, the model is silent on whether the necessary tax
is applied to labor income, consumption, or both. Although the real
equilibrium is invariant to the choice between f and t, the behavior
of the public sector deficit obviously is not. Deficits can be highly vari-
able if they involve mainly labor taxation, but relatively smooth if they
involve mainly consumption taxation. Trade deficits, on the contrary,
are invariant to the structure of taxation. Countries wishing to satisfy
the SGP and avoid volatility in government deficits may wish to use
the tax instrument that leads to smooth tax revenues. A closed economy
will also choose to maintain a measure of tax rates constant over time,
just as in the small open economy.
The character of the solution changes when we consider a commu-
nity of several countries, each of which is "large" in the sense that it
can affect community-wide prices via its fiscal policies. In this setting,
which we propose as a model of the EMU, each country faces an inter-
temporal constraint on its net exports of the form:
(3)210 Baxter & King
where p
l8t is a discount factor applicable to date t. For a large open
economy within an economic community, the effect of this constraint is
quite different from the comparable effect for a single (closed) country
or a small open economy, The government of a closed country knows
that its fiscal policies affect the discount factors {^S^^. However, in
this closed economy, macroeconomic equilibrium requires that [yt - g°t
- ct] = 0 so that the constraint is always satisfied in equilibrium and has
no bearing on tax policy. By contrast, the government of a small country
takes {Z?^}"^ as given and concentrates on the effects of its policies on
net exports, [y (- g°.t - ct], so as to assure that the constraint is satisfied.
With an intermediate size country, tax policy takes into account effects
on both intertemporal prices and net exports.
In community of "large" economies, a distinction emerges between
coordinated and uncoordinated national policies. A coordinated com-
munity policy emphasizes the requirement that at each date
i>;[y*-#-^]=o (4)
where 9. is the relative size of country /. Essentially, equation (4) speci-
fies that effects of tax policies on intertemporal prices do not cre-
ate wealth at the community level. In Nash equilibrium, by contrast,
governments have an incentive to choose tax rates that are high when
the economy would otherwise run positive net exports, so as to make
the "net wealth" on the left-hand side of (3), by reducing the world
intertemporal price. That is, governments would tend to choose labor
income tax policies that would stabilize their net exports relative to the
constant-tax-rate-case. Lack of coordination in fiscal policy thus tends
to stabilize net exports, relative to the coordinated fiscal policy regime.
2. Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union
This section presents information on the key fiscal policy variables in
the European Monetary Union (EMU). For comparison, we will also
include evidence for (1) countries that are part of the European Union
(EU) but not in the EMU, and (2) countries that are not in the EU.
2.1 A Current Snapshot
This sub-section describes the current situation in the EMU. Table 1
presents information on government expenditure, receipts, and theFiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 211
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Table 1 (continued)
EMU fiscal policy in 2004





































Median value 9.2% 52.5%
sectoral structure of employment. Panel A contains details of some spe-
cific categories of government expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
The median share of government total current disbursements (column
(iv)) is 49 percent of GDP, ranging from a low of 34.1 percent (Ireland)
to a high of 55.5 percent (France). Columns (i)-(iii) show government
expenditures in three main categories: (1) non-wage consumption; (2)
wage consumption; and (3) investment. (The remaining components
of government disbursements are largely transfers, especially social
security transfers.) Of the groups that we present, government wage
consumption is substantially larger than either non-wage consumption
or investment. Typically, wage consumption is about twice as large as
non-wage consumption, and is an order of magnitude larger than gov-
ernment investment. In light of these facts, we develop a model with
an important role for government wage consumption, i.e., government
hiring of labor.
Panel B contains information on government receipts. Direct taxes
and indirect taxes are about equally important in the EMU, each com-
prising about 12 percent of GDP. The difference between direct+indirect
taxes and total receipts is again due largely to social security contribu-
tions by employers, employees, and the self-employed.Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 213
Column (iv) of Panel B shows the government primary surplus for
2005. According to these official OECD figures, only three EMU countries
had deficits in 2004: France, Germany, and Ireland. The official figures
show these deficits much smaller than those that would violate the SGP.
Panel C of Table 1 shows a breakdown of employment between the
government sector and the business sector (this table does not include
the self-employed), expressed as a fraction of the working-age popula-
tion. Government employment is about one-sixth of the employment of
the business sector, with some variation across countries.
Table 2 provides more detailed information on aspects of taxation
in the EMU. For comparison, we also provide information for several
non-EMU members of the EU. The first three columns of the table show
the top marginal personal income tax rates for employees, with and
without social security contributions. For comparison, column 3 lists
the statutory income tax rate that would apply at the threshold for the
highest tax bracket. When the effect of social security contributions is
taken into effect, the median of the top marginal personal income tax
rate is higher than the median of the statutory income tax rate. For some
countries, the difference can be very large. For example, in Germany
the statutory tax rate is 47.5 percent for an individual with the highest
marginal tax rate (this corresponds to the actual tax rate, barring social
security), but when social security is taken into account, the marginal
tax rate is 13 percent higher than the statutory rate. Large discrepancies
are also observed for Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and
Portugal. Only for France and Austria is the actual marginal tax rate
(including social security) lower than the statutory rate. The non-EMU
countries listed in the bottom panel of the table contain one very low-tax
economy (the Slovak Republic), as well as two of the highest-tax-rate
countries in Europe: Denmark and Sweden. The discrepancy between
the statutory tax rate and the true marginal rate including social secu-
rity is very large for Hungary in particular, where the statutory rate is
38 percent and the true rate is 69.5 percent. The corresponding rates
for non-EU countries are listed at the bottom of the table. The median
rates are in line with the EMU countries. The notable difference is that,
among the non-EU countries, there is little difference between the true
rates and the statutory rates.
In contrast to the high variation among countries in marginal per-
sonal income tax rates, there is little cross-country variation in the VAT.
The median value is 19.3 percent. The highest VAT rate is in Finland
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rates at 15 percent and 16 percent, respectively. As a group, the non-
EMU countries have higher VAT rates than the EMU countries. Notably,
Denmark, Hungary, and Sweden have VAT rates of 25 percent—higher
than any of the EMU countries. The non-EU countries rely much less
heavily on the VAT, with the exception of Iceland.
The next-to-last column of Table 2 contains data on the corporate
income tax rates. There is wide variation across countries in this tax
rate, although the median in each group of countries is about 30 per-
cent. Each group of countries has some members with low corporate
taxes. In the EMU, Ireland has the lowest corporate tax rate, of only
12.5 percent. Hungary has the lowest rate (16 percent) of the non-EMU
members of the EU, and Iceland (18 percent) has the lowest corporate
tax rate in the non-EU group.
Finally, the last column of Table 2 contains a measure of what is com-
monly called the "wedge"
1-T"
(5)
since it indicates the combined effect of labor and consumption taxa-
tion on the relative price of leisure and consumption. To compute this
measure, we have used the statutory highest marginal personal income
tax rate as our measure of f and have used the VAT tax rate as our mea-
sure of f. Given its prominence in public discussions of fiscal policy in
Europe, we examine the behavior of the "wedge" under optimal fiscal
policy in our analysis below.
2.2 A Longer View
This sub-section presents some evidence on the evolution of the key
fiscal variables over the past 45 years. Figure 1 shows total government
receipts and disbursements, expressed as shares of GDP. For most of
the EMU countries, the government share of GDP has exhibited a ris-
ing trend since the early part of the sample. Ireland shows the opposite
trend. Although government expenditure and receipts has been rising
in Ireland, GDP has been rising faster still. Figure 2 shows the govern-
ment "primary balance" as a share of GDP. Figure 3 graphs employ-
ment by the government and by the business sector as a fraction of
the working age population. The self-employed are not included in the
business-sector total. Employment in the government sector has been a
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than employment in the business sector. Figure 4 plots the government
primary balance (the government surplus) against net exports. It may
seem odd to graph these two variables together. However, our theo-
retical model highlights the relationship (actually, the potential lack
thereof) between these two economic variables and we will refer back
to this figure later on. Table 3 presents summary volatility and correla-
tion statistics for the fiscal and trade deficits. The volatility measure is
the standard deviation of annual growth rates. In most countries, the
trade deficit is somewhat more volatile than the fiscal deficit. There is
no clear pattern at all to the correlation between the fiscal deficit and
the trade deficit: the correlations range from -0.32 (Spain) to 0.83 (Ire-
land). Our theory illustrates why, in an optimal tax setting, there need
be no strong relationship between the trade and fiscal deficits.
Finally, Figure 5 plots three components of government expenditure,
each measured as a fraction of GDP: (1) non-wage consumption (pur-
chases of goods and services); (2) final wage consumption (purchases of
labor), and (3) government fixed capital formation (investment). Gov-
ernment transfers are not included. Government wage expenditure is
the largest of the three components of government expenditure, and
shows a flat to slightly rising trend over the past 40 years. Government
purchases of goods and services is one-half to two-thirds as large as
government expenditure on labor, and exhibits a similar flat-to-slightly-
rising trend over this period. Government investment represents the
smallest GDP share of the three components, and has been falling as a
fraction of GDP in several countries.
3. A Model of an Economic Community
We will study a community with / countries which are indexed by / = 1,
2,.../. There will be several elements which distinguish a country. First,
each country will have a unified labor market, with no labor mobility
across countries. Second, countries will be subject to country-specific
shocks to productivity and government purchases. Countries may dif-
fer in terms of size. We use 6 to denote country j's fraction of commu-
nity population, thus 6 > 0 and Z
J=1 6 = 1.
3.1 Structure of Basic Model
In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, all countries produce
the same internationally traded final good, which can be used for pub-
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Table 3

























































We will assume that countries produce the single good according to
constant-returns-to-scale production functions which depend only on
labor input and have time-varying productivity levels. Private output
is therefore of the form:
w, = a.{n.-Q
n)
where a.t is labor productivity. As above, yt is output in country/ at time
t, nt is total labor input, and g"t is government use of labor input.
3.1.2 Labor Markets
We assume that there is a competitive labor market in each country.
Competition ensures that the real wage—measured in units of the con-
sumption good—in country; is given by
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3.1.3 Government
We assume that each country's government faces an exogenous require-
ment for two types of purchases: (1) purchases of labor for its own use,
and (2) purchases of the consumption good. At date t, let g°.t be the
amount of purchases of goods and g"t be country; purchases of labor.
Let r
nt be the period t labor income tax rate in country j and let f.t be the
consumption tax rate.
3.2 Dynamic Elements
We assume that there is a single, community-wide market in which all
public and private financial instruments are traded. We assume that
this market establishes a discount factor, P
l8t, which is the price of a
unit of the consumption good at t (ft and 5t will be discussed further
below).
3.2.1 Private and Public Intertemporal Budget Constraints
Private saving per capita in country / is
(1-T;)wjtnjt-(1 + T
cjt)cjt (6)
where c.t is the amount of country ;'s private consumption demand for
the aggregate good. The representative household's budget constraint
is therefore
[{l-T;)wjtnjt-{l + T)t)c]t\. (7) t=o
The country / government's primary surplus at date t is
Sjt = i)ppi + fyft ~ WjtSlt ~ g
cjt (8)
and the government's intertemporal budget constraint is
s,. (9)
These imply a country-wide constraint (3), as discussed in the introduc-
tion:
t=Q f=0
which is the requirement that the discounted value of a country's net
exports is zero.Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 225
3.2.2 Intertemporal Consumption and Labor Supply Choices
Agents in country / maximize
subject to the household budget constraint. We assume that the momen-
tary utility function takes the form
u(c, n) = — c
l-° —2- n
1+Y. (10)
l-<7 1 + 7




where A is a country-specific Lagrange multiplier which assures that
the household's budget constraint is satisfied. Generally, these condi-
tions define a set of Frischian behavioral equations for consumption
and labor, which are each functions of A.St(l + T°.^ and A £t(l - T
nt)zvr
With the specified momentary utility function, we have a simpler, con-
stant elasticity form of consumption demand,
Labor supply also takes on a constant elasticity form,
These rules imply that individuals substitute away from consumption
and leisure when the intertemporal relative price, 8t, is high. Individu-
als also substitute toward work in periods in which the after-tax wage
rate is high.
The multiplier A has a number of properties of importance to us
below. We illustrate the first of these by noting that, with the specified
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Hence, if all of the intertemporal prices are scaled up so that 8\ = §8t,
then the multiplier is scaled by 1/0. This is just a consequence of the
fact that real demands for goods and leisure are invariant to units in
which prices are stated.
3.3 Community General Equilibrium
Our assumption is that the community is closed, which we think of as a
workable approximation to the idea that the community is a large part
of the world, as is Europe. We find it useful to think about the; equilib-
rium in two steps. First, given aggregate demand and interest rates,
the market for each country's goods and factors must clear. Second,
aggregate demand and interest rates must be consistent with the over-
all equilibrium conditions of the community.
Community per-capita consumption demand is
and total government consumption is
G'=ieilg'lr
Aggregate world supply of the good, in per capita terms, is given by the
weighted sum of all countries' outputs:
Equating the aggregate supply and demand for goods implies an equi-
librium sequence {£f}7=0.
Our interest is in studying settings in which each government must
obey its budget constraint: there are no intergovernmental transfers. We
explore two alternative assumptions about interactions across govern-
ments: (1) the community's governments cooperate to as to maximize
the joint welfare of their citizens with the setting of their tax instru-
ments; and (2) each government maximizes the welfare of its citizens,
taking the policies of other governments as given. Before turning to this
analysis, we discuss optimal taxation in simpler settings.
4. Background on Optimal Taxation
To establish some core ideas and benchmark results, this section studies
three basic settings. First, following Ramsey, we consider a closed econ-Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 227
omy, as addressed in most analyses of fiscal policy. Second, we consider
a small open economy, paralleling the Ramsey analysis of the closed
economy. Third, we consider an alternative approach to the analysis
of the small open economy, which is easier to extend to the analysis of
interacting economies. In all of the settings that we study, an important
element is the equilibrium form of the government budget constraint.
4.1 The Government Budget Constraint in Equilibrium
To study a formulation of the government's problem that does not
involve taxes or market prices, we start by noting that the government





jt)cjt +yjt -g]t -cjt ]
where the first line simply involves adding and subtracting consump-
tion and labor income; the second makes use of the equilibrium wage
rate and the production function; and the third imposes the require-
;
Multiplying by A. and imposing the private sector first-order condi-
tions, we arrive at the requirement that
ic(Cjti njt)cjt + un(cjt,njt)nt]>0. (14)
That is: the government budget constraint in equilibrium is the
requirement that the private sector must be able to afford to purchase
the quantities that the government chooses for it, when the prices are
stated in marginal utility units.
Since this expression will appear repeatedly below, it is convenient
for us to have a short-hand version of it. Defining q(ct, n) = [uc(ct, nf)ct + un(ct, nt)nt], we can thus write the equilibrium government budget
constraint as
(15)
for country /'.228 Baxter & King
4.2 Neutral Tax Changes
A standard result in public finance is that consumption taxes and labor
income taxes are equivalent instruments when switches between these
involve no change in government revenue. In intertemporal frame-
works, such as those which we study in this paper, this equivalence




for all dates t. In view of the government budget constraint in equilib-
rium (15), it is clear that this policy is revenue neutral for any positive
<;. Further, the government budget constraint in equilibrium implies
the private sector budget constraint: both are essentially £~=0/?'St[-(1 -
T
nt)w.tn.t + (1+ t
c.t)ct] - 0. In view of the first order conditions, this policy
is behavior ally neutral when the multiplier adjusts according to
which in turn is consistent with the original budget constraint. So, such
a switch in tax policy is neutral on all accounts.
Hence, for exploration of behavior—including the analysis of opti-
mal policy—a country's fiscal policy is better summarized by an effec-
tive consumption wedge and an effective labor wedge,
than by the statutory tax rates themselves.
4.3 Single Country Benchmark
Our model is structured so that it would be optimal to have constant
tax rates over time if there were a single country. To display this result
and provide the background for some aspects of our analysis of an eco-
nomic community, we start by supposing that there is a single; country
(the country subscript,/, will not appear). In this setting, the appropri-
ate Ramsey tax problem is to maximizeFiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 229








the government budget constraint
and the private sector first order conditions ((11) and (12) above), which
take the form
for the closed economy.
There are a series of conceptual and technical issues about this closed
economy problem that bear on our analysis below. First, a crucial com-
ponent of the closed-economy Ramsey problem is that the government
understands that it can have effects on prices—specifically the inter-
temporal prices 8t—and takes this effect on its own budget constraint
into account. Second, the closed-economy Ramsey problem is most
often analyzed in its "primal" form, with optimal (second-best) quan-
tities derived and their implications for taxes and market prices then
deduced.
Accordingly, the constrained optimization problem has a Lagrangian
of the form
where the multiplier O has the interpretation as the cost of satisfying
the equilibrium government budget constraint (15) and the multiplier
\ has the conventional interpretation as the shadow value of goods at
t. The Ramsey planner's first order conditions are
uc(ct, n) + ®qc(ct, n) - \ = 0 (16)
un(ct, n) + <$>qn{ct, n) + \at = 0
at each date t. As Lucas and Stokey (1983) observe, these efficiency
conditions look like those for a standard representative agent optimiza-
tion problem, except that the preferences of the agent are modified from230 Baxter & King
u(ct, nt) to u(ct, n) + <&q{ct, n). In general, then, the second-best quantities
can be determined by solving an optimization problem which includes
the requirements that: consumption and work decisions satisfy the first-
order conditions; the resource constraint and the equilibrium version of
the government budget constraint.
We assume that the first order conditions are sufficient, as well as
necessary, to determine optimal sequences of quantities, {c*}~=0 and
{nt}°°t=0. The standard concavity assumptions on utility do not guarantee
that this will be automatically satisfied in this "second best" setting, but
we proceed under this assumption as in most other work in the optimal
taxation literature.
4.3.1 Supporting Prices and Tax Rates
In order for optimal quantities to arise in competitive equilibrium, taxes
and prices must satisfy
wt = at (17)
(l-T?)at8tocUn(ctfnt).
These conditions highlight the following facts about supporting
prices and tax rates. First, as in every real general equilibrium model,
the prices 8t are determined only up to a scale factor. Second, in terms of
bringing about the optimal allocation, there are two alternative modes
of taxation that are essentially perfect substitutes. Notice that the argu-
ment here is much stronger than the one discussed in section 4.2: the
theory is silent on the composition of consumption and labor taxation




Hence, the entire time path of consumption taxation may be viewed
as arbitrary, with market discount prices responding to bring about a
particular "full price" of consumption (1 + T°)8t.
4.3.2 Implications for Tax Rates
With our specified preferences, even though we cannot solve explicitly
for optimal quantities, it is direct to show that (a) there is one sense inFiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 231
which the burden of tax rates must be constant over time; and (b) there
is a wide range of policies for f and t that are potentially optimal.
The planner sets
un{ct,nt)+<S>qn{ctlnt)=^ uc{c*t,nt)+&qc(c,,nt) "
while private agents set
uc(ct,nt)
The ratio of these conditions implies that
1 -T" uc(ct,n]) + <&qc(ct,n]) un(ct,n])
un(ct,nt)+®qn(ct,n]) uc(ct,nt)'






right-hand side is invariant to the date-f values of consumption and
work,
}
Thus, the "wedge" depends on the preference parameters that control
the elasticities of consumption demand and labor supply, as well as
the multiplier that insures that the government budget constraint is
satisfied. As this condition makes clear, optimal quantities are consis-
tent with either labor income taxation, consumption taxation or a mix-
ture of the two. But the "wedge," (1 - T")/(1 + T
ct), must be constant
over time.
4.3.3 Dynamic Responses
Following a general strategy in modern macroeconomics, we can study
the response of the economy to perturbations in the exogenous vari-
ables of the closed economy model via linear approximation methods
around a stationary point. In particular, we consider a stationary point
with a specific tax wedge, which is set so that the government balances
its flow budget constraint (since every period is identical in the station-
ary economy, this also balances the economy's intertemporal budget
constraint). The stationary point is then values of c, n, (1 - T")/(1 + r
c)




The first two of these expressions are readily interpretable as involving
(1) the equating of labor demand and labor supply; and (2) the equating
of goods demand and goods supply. The third is a stationary version of
the government budget constraint in equilibrium (13), which is also the
stationary household budget constraint. Given these stationary values,
the multiplier <£ is also determined, since it must satisfy (18).
We can then explore the implications of small perturbations in the
sequences {at}; {g
ct}; {#"}; around the stationary values a, g, g
n. In the pro-
cess, we hold fixed the multiplier O, so that the analysis corresponds to
the effects of shocks in the presence of complete financial markets, as in
Lucas and Stokey (1983).
In fact, in this setting, it is feasible to study the dynamic responses
analytically by differentiating the Ramsey planner's first order condi-
tions (16) and the equations governing supporting prices and tax rates
(17). Essentially, the absence of production-side connections across
periods means that the economy's outcomes correspond to those of a
static model. Derivations along these lines produce a solution for opti-
mal work effort, which takes the form
where sc = c/(c + g
0), s =g
c/(c + g°) and 0 = an/(c + g°).
2 That is, increases
in government consumption of goods and labor services lead to higher
work effort, while productivity exerts an ambiguous effect (due, essen-
tially, to offsetting income and substitution effects).
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so that it declines with both types of government purchases and rises
with productivity.
4.4 Small Open Economy Benchmark
In the case where the economy is asymptotically small, actions by pri-
vate agents or the government have no effect on the intertemporal prices
that are determined at the community level. Accordingly, the govern-
ment selects quantities subject to its budget constraint ((13), which con-
tinues to imply (15) in the small open economy) and the requirement
that the country have net exports that obey the intertemporal constraint
(3).
A Ramsey planner's constrained optimization problem for quantities
thus has a Lagrangian of the form
where the multiplier O may be interpreted as the cost of satisfying the
government budget constraint and Y is the shadow value of relaxing
the constraint that the intertemporal market value of net exports is zero.
The first-order conditions are
"»(Cjt'
 njt) + ^fln (Cjt, njt) = Yfian
plus the two constraints.
4.4.1 Supporting Prices and Taxes
The small open economy faces exogenous intertemporal prices, {St}, so
that the conditions for supporting prices and tax rates are
wt = at (19)
1 . *
(1 + Tf) = —«c(c(/nf)234 Baxter & King
4.4.2 Implications for Tax Rates
We can use these conditions to deduce three key results about optimal
policy for the small open economy.
Result #1 Combining the foregoing with the private marginal rate of
substitution implies that
should be constant over time, as we obtained in the prior closed econ-
omy case. Thus, the "wedge" is constant over time in the small open
economy, just as it was in the closed economy.
Result #2 The ratio of the private to planner consumption first-order
conditions for consumption requires that the consumption tax rate





Since all three multipliers on the right-hand side of this expression are
constant over time, the consumption tax rate is also constant over time.
Hence, for the small open economy, optimal taxation implies no inter-
temporal distortions in consumption.
Result #3 The theory is silent on the determinants of the levels of
the labor tax and the consumption tax. Either can be used to raise rev-
enue efficiently—and yield precisely the same optimal quantities—
when assumed constant over time. While the government of the small
open economy cannot affect the intertemporal prices {dt}, it can affect
the relative price of consumption and work, which it can do either with
a uniformly higher labor income tax or uniformly higher consumption
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This result for the small open economy is essentially the general neu-
tral tax result discussed in section 4.2, operating at the level of a country
rather than a representative individual. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, there are consequently a variety of efficient government deficit
paths for the small open economy that are consistent with efficient taxa-







where the constant tax rate is z" = E~=0/?
f£t[g
ct + fl.^
nf]/Z~=0 /^[a (n f].
3 By
contrast, if the consumption tax rate is used alone, then the surplus is
Sjt T>jCjt gjt
 Ujt6jt




consumption likely would be much smoother than income for this small
open economy, the government deficit would be much more volatile
with labor income taxation.
4.4.3 Dynamic Responses
There are quite different dynamic responses for the small open econ-
omy relative to the closed economy. Variations in productivity stimulate
strong intertemporal substitutions, in the sense that n* moves together
with at according to
1 1
log(nf / n) = - log(«, / a) + - log(5f / 5)
7 7
while consumption is not affected by productivity,
/c)=--
(7
Variations in government consumption and government employ-
ment have no effect on either of the optimal quantities {c]} and {n*}.
These patterns of dynamic responses are characteristic of a small open
economy under complete markets (see, for example, the discussion
in Baxter 1995). Each derives from the effect that the wealth effects
of shocks is insured away in these markets, leaving only substitution
effects.
Intertemporal relative prices, {<5>}, also exert substitution effects,
encouraging work and discouraging consumption in periods with high236 Baxter & King
8. However, both the private sector and government of a small open
economy view these prices as exogenous to their decisions.
4.5 The Direct Approach
In studying the small open economy above, we followed the Ramsey
approach of computing optimal quantities, with the benefit that we
could then deduce the implications for tax rates just discussed. An alter-
native look at the nature of the optimal taxation problem is afforded by
the direct choice of optimal tax rates, given the conditions of govern-
ment budget balance and macroeconomic equilibrium. We employ this
direct approach within our analysis of community general equilibrium,
but we start by considering its application in the context of the small
open economy.
To implement the approach, it would be natural to write a representa-
tive agent indirect utility function that depends on tax rates as follows:
and then optimize with respect to tax rates, given a set of constraints.
However, we have seen in section 4.2 that there are combinations of tax
rates on labor income and consumption that are behaviorally equiva-
lent if government revenue neutrality is imposed. This latitude is not
desirable from the standpoint of the direct approach.
However, in section 4.2, we also saw that equivalent sequences of
labor and consumption taxes could be readily related using a rescaling
of the multiplier on the household's budget constraint. Hence, we use
the effective wedges %\ - A (1 + T^) and %
njt = A.(l - r
nt) as representing
each class of equivalent tax rates. Then, we view small open economy
as maximizing
subject to decision rules for consumption and work,
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and the intertemporal constraint on net exports
We think of the joint solution for optimal quantities and effective
wedges as determining the fundamentals of fiscal policy. Once we have
worked out this solution, we can construct any desired member of the
class of equivalent fiscal policies, by calculating
A;
for a specified value of A.
4.5.1 Efficiency Conditions for Taxation
The Lagrangian for the planner's problem is
f=0
The efficiency condition for consumption is as follows:
The first three terms indicate that an efficient internal price of consump-
tion %
c.t takes into account: (1) the effect of the change in this price on
utility; (2) the effect on the government budget constraint; and (3) the
effect on the present discounted value of the country's net exports.
The efficiency condition for the internal price of labor £".f takes a sym-
metric form
Note that the bracketed terms are exactly the first-order conditions
of the Ramsey method with respect to quantities. Hence, the Ramsey
method and the direct method each require that the bracketed terms
be set to zero at an optimum: the results of the Ramsey and the direct238 Baxter & King
method for quantities and values of the effective wedges are therefore
identical.
5. Optimal Policy without Coordination
If the governments of the countries cannot coordinate their actions, they
nevertheless recognize that these actions will have implications for the
prices and quantities that will prevail in community-wide markets. We
are interested in a Nash equilibrium of the game between the / differ-
ent countries governments. That is, in posing the optimal tax policy
for an individual-country's government—for concreteness, country
1—we assume that the tax policies for the other governments are taken
as given. In addition, country l's government assumes that local and
world markets clear.
Following the discussion in the previous section, we assume that
each government chooses sequence of effective consumption and labor
wedges, i.e., selects a fundamental fiscal policy. Then, when we con-
sider a Nash game between the country governments, the strategy of
the government of country/ is given by {%
ct}°°t=Q and {%"t}°°t=0.
5.1 Community Equilibrium with Exogenous Policies
In the intermediate case that we now study, a government's fiscal
actions may have effect both on intertemporal prices and net exports.
Community goods market equilibrium requires that
H
where G«t = Z^dfo G"t = V^Ja^, G, = G\ + G« and C, = £>=10r, as
above. We also define a measure of community total output (the sum of
private and public output),
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The various supplies and demands are governed by
Accordingly, the market-clearing price is implicitly given by
0=Yt-Ct-Gt = (21)
so that the equilibrium price depends on productivity; consumption
and labor tax rates; and the aggregate government expenditure shock.
We write this price function as
*({^1, {§}J=1,{§}}=1, Gt).
The effects on intertemporal prices take a natural form. For example,
since Yt = Ct + Gt, we know that the effect of government demand on the





where the second line expresses the slope of the "excess supply of
goods" using the relevant labor supply and consumption demand elas-
ticities.
As an intermediate-size economy, the government in country 1 takes
as given the fiscal policies in other countries, treating {£t}°°t=0, {£
n-t}°°t=Q as
parametric for all t and for/ = 2,...,/. It takes into account the effects of
its own fiscal actions on intertemporal prices via the constraint above.











Note that the effect of a country's fiscal actions on the intertemporal
price involve the effect on its own labor supply or consumption and240 Baxter & King
the effect of supply/demand shifts on the equilibrium price. More spe-
cifically, note that the magnitude of these intertemporal price effects of
country ; fiscal policy thus depends positively on the size of the coun-
try, a.
5.2 Optimal Taxation for Country j
We now consider country j's optimal tax problem, using the "direct
form" described above in the context of the small open economy:
(=0
To make the first-order conditions as simple as possible, we view the
government of country; as choosing the relevant tax wedge, %
c.f8t or
%
ntSt. This simplifies the algebra somewhat and corresponds to the idea
that the country ; government (1) understands the effects of its tax
actions on intertemporal prices and (2) understands that its tax actions
affect intertemporal prices through their effects on quantities supplied
to or demanded from the international market.
5.2.1 Efficiency Conditions for Country j
The efficiency condition for ^\5t takes the form
As in the case of the small open economy exported in section 4, the
first three terms indicate that an efficient effective wedge—represented
by %
c.t8t—takes into account: (1) the effect of the change in this price
on utility; (2) the effect on the government budget constraint; and (3)
the effect on the present discounted value of the country's net exports.
However, in the current case of an intermediate size economy, there
are two components to this last term: the direct expenditure effect (T.St)
also present in the small open economy case and a new indirect effect
via the country's effect on the community discount factor (Yx().
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As with the previous, there is an effect operating through the commu-
nity discount factor,
rit
These expressions both contain effects of country j's fiscal actions on
the world intertemporal price 5t. These may be shown to be
dst d ej dcjt
((^/t)(Q^)
dSt _ x 9^ dnlt
%?fi) I(Y( -e.a]tnlt)+\ct -ejCjt) %?£)
The preceding two first-order conditions imply basic restrictions








0 = unii + Ofl +Tj8tajt-rjStajtej ^ (26)
where z.( is defined as
Note that these country; fiscal policy conditions are those of the small
open economy problem, modified by the presence of terms involving
x.Jzr Accordingly, if x.t = 0, then the intermediate size country chooses
the same tax rates as the small country.
5.2.2 Implications for Optimal Taxation
More generally, we can use the equilibrium conditions (25) and (26) to
determine aspects of the optimal tax structure.
First, we consider constancy of the "wedge." Taking the ratios of
these two conditions, we see that
•=ait — =a.242 Baxter & King
so that the optimal policy involves
so that the "wedge" is constant over time as in all of the other models
above. However, as we shall see below, it is no longer the case that the
tax rates are constant over time, so that constancy of the "wedge" now
implies that the labor income tax and the consumption tax must move
inversely.
Second, we consider variation in components of the "wedge." The
labor condition (25) implies that
so that optimal labor is higher in situations where the country is a net
importer (xt < 0) and lower when it is a net exporter (xt > 0).
4 In order to
bring about this higher labor, it is necessary that there be a labor tax rate
when the country is a net importer. Further, given that there is a lower
labor tax, there must be a higher consumption tax, given the inverse
relationship which we determined above. Both taxes thus work to cut
net imports, thus lowering the price that the country faces for being a
net importer.
5.3 Nash Equilibrium
In a Nash equilibrium, each country chooses its optimal tax policy taking
as given the actions of the others. From above, we can see that there are
two main mechanisms by which countries interact. First, the community
discount factor 8t affects the supply and demand for goods in all coun-










so that other country's tax actions—which affect the aggregate quanti-
ties produced Yt and consumed Ct—are relevant to country ;'s fiscal
policy and production.
A Nash equilibrium, then, requires that each country j's choices of
effective wedges are consistent with the conditions (equilibrium condi-
tions (25) and (26)). In addition, a Nash equilibrium requires the condi-Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 243
tions of community general equilibrium discussed in sections 3.3 and
4.1.
To study the dynamic responses of economies within such a Nash
equilibrium, we then can adopt the same approach as used for the
closed economy and the small open economy. First, we consider a
stationary equilibrium in which all of the countries are the same in
terms of a, g°, and g
n, so that each has a position of zero net exports.
In such a setting, the discussion above leads to the conclusion that
each country will choose the same constant levels of <* and £?. Second,
we log-linearize the relevant equilibrium conditions—including (25)
and (26)—around this stationary position and then consider the
response to small perturbations in productivity and government pur-
chases.
Before doing so, we briefly consider how the Nash equilibrium out-
comes would differ from those in a setting with policy coordination.
6. Optimal Policy with Coordination
If tax policy is coordinated across countries, then a natural objective
is to maximize a weighted average of welfare for community
members (these utility weights are #.). However, in considering this
coordinated situation, we continue to require that each country satisfy
its present value budget constraint and its government budget con-
straint: there are no transfers between governments or economies other
than through the price system. The appropriate Lagrangian for this
problem is then
J ;=1 L (=0
f=0
where the first line is the weighted-average objective; the second line
represents the requirement that coordinated policy respect each of
the government budget constraints; and the third line represents the
requirement that coordinated policy represent each of the country bud-
get constraints.
For the single decision maker, the first-order conditions with respect





In each of these expressions, notice that the community decision-
maker takes into account the effect on all countries' budget constraints
of changing the community-wide discount factor. In this sense, the
community decision-maker can choose tax rates that are quite different
from those of the single country decision-maker.
An important reference case comes about when the decision-maker
attaches the same weight to all country budget constraints (T^ = Y).





 ahtglt - Sit -
 cht)] = 0,
implies that the second line of both conditions above is zero. Accord-
ingly, the community decision-maker will choose country tax rates on
labor and consumption that are constant across time, resulting in the
same deficit behavior in each country as if it were small.
7. Effects of Government Purchases
To study the nature of fiscal externalities within an economic commu-
nity, we now consider a particular shock, an increase in government
consumption in one country that is persistent but ultimately temporary.
In particular, we suppose that
where 0 < p < 1 and et is a shock. Accordingly, the effect of a shock at
date 0 is to cause a revision upward in the path of government pur-
chases of goods, as shown in the first panel of Figure 6. We choose an
eQ =.05 as we assume that government purchases are 20 percent of totalFiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 245
-0.4
Figure 6
Effects of increase in country-1 government consumption
purchases s = (g/(g + c) = .2 and we want to consider a shock that is
equal to 1 percent of private output (c + g).
7.1 Benchmarks
Our analysis in section 4 above provides two benchmarks.
Small open economy: If there is a surprise in government purchases in
the small open economy, then the public and private sectors have previ-
ously assured against this adverse outcome—essentially a negative net
income shock for the country—in the complete financial markets of the
community. Tax rates are held constant in the face of this disturbance.
There are no effects on either work or consumption. In fact, the only
manifestations are in the country's net exports, which decline by Ag
and in the government's primary deficit, which rises by Ag.
Closed economy: The private and public sectors of the closed economy
would like to insure against this shock, but it is impossible for them to
do so since there is no international trade in securities. Accordingly, as246 Baxter & King
discussed in section 4.3, there must be a rise in work and a decline in
consumption: each of these is stimulated by the prices St for those peri-
ods which are affected by the increase in government expenditure. In
particular, if we consider the implications for the real one period return
implied by these prices,







where K= JS /[o(p + }«c] with terms defined as shown in section 4.3.3.
Hence, in the closed economy, the real rate of return rises if there is
an increase in government consumption. The difference between these
two responses lies in the fact that the small open economy can "export"
the financing of higher government purchases to the world financial
markets, while the closed economy cannot.
7.2 An Intermediate Size Country
We now consider the same disturbance in an intermediate size country,
which is 40 percent of the economic community under two alternative
assumptions.
7.2.1 Constant Tax Rates
If the country's fiscal decision-maker's ignored their influence on the
prices {St}°°t=0 in choosing their tax rates, then these would be constant
over time. Further, under a coordinated fiscal policy, as discussed
above, there are circumstances under which it is optimal for all coun-
tries to maintain constant tax rates. Accordingly, we begin by studying
this case.
The economic community is assumed to be closed to the rest of the
world. Therefore, the burden of higher government purchases must be
borne by its citizens. Accordingly, all of the community's citizens work
harder and consume less, with the market prices (interest rates) sig-
naling that this is desirable. However, since the shock applies only to
one of the community's economies, it has a smaller effect on prices and
interest rates, scaled by the measure of 01 as in the discussions of gen-Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 247
eral equilibrium above. In the simulations displayed in Figures 6 and 7,
this fraction is .40, so that the interpretation is that the shock is equal to
.40 percent of community private output (C + G).
Accordingly, the constant tax responses shown in Figure 6—indicated
by the solid lines—show that consumption declines and labor supply
increases, following the path of the shock. Net exports from country
decline by about .5 percent of its GDP on impact. That is, although the
shock is initially 1 percent, part of it is offset by consumption declines
and labor supply increases.
7.2.2 Nash Equilibrium Taxes
When fiscal planners of country 1 take into account their influence on
the market prices {St}, they choose to cut the path of the labor income
tax rate and raise the path of the consumption tax rate, as shown in the
bottom panels of Figure 6 (the dashed lines indicate responses under
Nash taxation throughout all panels). Consequently, there are responses
of greater magnitude in country 1 labor and consumption than arise
Figure 7
Effects on labor, consumption, net exports, and the fiscal surplus248 Baxter & King
under constant tax rates. Further, as discussed at the end of section 5,
this policy has the effect of smoothing net exports: as shown in Figure 7',
these become substantially less responsive to the government purchase
shock in the home country. At the same time, declines in tax revenue
mean that there is relatively little difference between the government's
primary deficit under constant and optimal taxation. In each case, the
deficit is dominated by the path of government purchases.
7.2.3 Fiscal Externalities
There are two types of externalities which we see as operating in this
experiment and which bear further discussion.
First, treating the case of constant tax rates as proximately optimal
under coordination, country 1 exerts a pecuniary externality on the eco-
nomic community: the fact that it is using more goods leads to price
variations that affect other members of the community. That is: there
are gains to sharing the risk of variations in public purchases across
members of the community. Markets handle these external effects effi-
ciently.
Second, there are policy externalities—which can be interpreted as
coordination failure or imperfect competition externalities—that arise
because individual national fiscal policies take into account the effect
of their policy actions on community prices. In the current setting of a
government purchase (demand) shock, this lack of coordination means
that the home country responds more and the community responds
less to the shock, thus reducing the effectiveness of community risk-
sharing.
8. Summary and Conclusions
Motivated by the Stability and Growth Pact, we have laid the ground-
work for studying the external effects of national fiscal policies within
an economic community, working within an entirely real dynamic
general equilibrium model. While the model is simplistic and abstract,
there are some conclusions from the analysis that seem likely to apply
to other more complicated and realistic models in the future.
First, the SGP is cast in terms of government deficits. However,
our model highlights the international transmission of fiscal policy
between countries not via the government deficit, but via the country's
net exports.
Second, there are some economic mechanisms that make the trade
deficit and the government deficit tend to move together. For example,Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Taxation in an Economic Community 249
holding other variables fixed, a rise in government consumption will
increase both deficits. In this way, an individual country's fiscal policy
can have effects on other countries, which are transmitted via interest
rates.
Third, the comovement of these deficit measures clearly depends as
well on the tax system, i.e., on how the tax rates and are determined.
Further, to learn about whether there can be important fiscal exter-
nalities of national policies when there are optimizing governments, we
determined the behavior of optimal tax rates within some alternative
settings. Again, there are important lessons that seem to be general.
For a small country within our basic model, which assumes that its
policies have no effect on community-wide interest rates, it is optimal
to make tax rates constant over time, but the model is silent on whether
the necessary tax is applied to labor income or consumption. While
the result on tax rate constancy is dependent on the specification of
preferences, the model's stress that there are a variety of consumption
and income tax policies that are consistent with a given real equilib-
rium is more general. Further, while the real equilibrium is invariant
to the choice between consumption and income taxes, the behavior of
the public sector deficit is not. Deficits can be highly variable if they
involve mainly labor taxation, but relatively smooth if they involve
mainly consumption taxation. That is: countries wishing to satisfy the
SGP and avoid volatility in government deficits may wish to use the
tax instrument that leads to smooth tax revenues. Hence, community
agreements like the SGP may be subject to manipulation via changes in
the structure of taxation. Our model highlights this by showing that a
very wide range of behavior of government deficits is consistent with
optimal taxation, yet these alternative deficits all involve the country
having the same effect on the economic community because its net
exports are invariant to the structure of taxation.
When we turn to countries that are "large" in the economic com-
munity, we stress that the government of a single large country knows
that its fiscal policies affect the intertemporal prices determined in com-
munity asset markets. In such a setting, a distinction emerges between
coordinated and uncoordinated national fiscal policies.
Fiscal policies which are coordinated at the community level will,
as our model stresses, recognize that the effects of national tax policies
intertemporal prices do not create wealth at the community level, but
rather redistribute between its members.
By contrast, with uncoordinated fiscal policies—which we model
using a Nash equilibrium—governments have an incentive to choose250 Baxter & King
tax rates that increase the price of exports when the country is a net
exporter and reduce the price when the country is a net importer. In
our model, these effects operate on financial markets, with fiscal policy
aimed at lowering the cost of financing national net export deficits and
increasing the value of having national net export surpluses. In our
model, we show that these national fiscal policies will therefore work
to stabilize net exports relative to the constant tax rate solution, which
is approximately optimal under coordinated policies.
Notes
1. Our analysis of optimal taxation follows the Ramsey approach of Lucas and Stokey
(1983) and Chamley (1986); some aspects of our results on tax rates in Nash equilibrium
are similar to the tariff equilibrium described in Kennan and Riezman (1990). Other
recent analyses of international monetary and fiscal policy coordination include Feldstein
(1988), Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Lambertini (2005).
2. Given that we have seen that the tax rate is constant over time, this equation for work
and that below for consumption are most easily derived by approximating the conditions
(1 - f )/(l + f)at = -un(ct,nt)/uc(ct,nt) and ct + g\ = at{nt-g
n) around the stationary point.
3. Notice that it is not appropriate to say that "world discount factors do not affect the
optimal tax rate" since the labor income tax rate depends on two present values. How-
ever, world discount factors do not affect the desirability of smoothing the tax rate over
time.
4. This discussion is somewhat heuristic, as the surplus is a function of labor and con-
sumption, but it describes the direction of tax effects appropriately.
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